What will be in a US-Iran deal in 2026?Dilution of Iran's Uranium
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Odds now
The market prices a 13% chance that this market resolves YES, as of .
YES13¢
NO88¢
as of
What moved the odds?
3 AI-matched news signals on this market, newest first. Entry price is the called side when the news hit; the signed return marks it against the live price as of .
Eslami, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization: “We will not give up the right to enrich and we will not hand over uranium.” A few important points about the statement made by the head of the country’s atomic energy:
1. Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, who is now also one of the options for the Ministry of Oil, has fired a salvo for those who are seeking an agreement in the Iran-US negotiations; the main red line and breaking point for America - and especially Israel - is “zeroing Iran’s enrichment capacity,” “halting Iran’s will to enrich,” and also “failing to withdraw 400 kilos of 60% uranium.”
2. If America withdraws even 1% from this war with a symbolic bombing - which I personally find unthinkable with this volume of military equipment being sent to the region by America - Israel will not tolerate Iran’s right to enrich and also the failure to withdraw uranium from Iran. Especially since Iran will have the excuse and evidence to move towards a nuclear military dimension with the last two wars.
3. The Americans claim that they took control of at least part of the strait and reduced the importance of the Strait of Hormuz from the south of the strait and part of it in the territory of the Emirates (a 480-meter waterway dredged by the Emirates and used by small oil ships), and in negotiations with Iran, nuclear energy must definitely be on the table and an agreement must be reached on it, as Trump intends.
4. Special inspections of Iran's new facilities by the United States are also not rational; a part of Iran's nuclear facilities that did not have a single particle of contamination was also targeted in the last two wars; the inspections of Fordow and Kalang are also for a new war and not to verify Iran's will.
5. Despite the efforts of some - which were arbitrarily made to bring Iran into the nuclear military dimension - the leadership of the revolutionary martyrs were not satisfied with the atomic bomb until the moment of their martyrdom. Iran paid the ultimate price for having a nuclear weapon but did not build it; whether it was right or wrong will be determined in the future.
From @Reuters via @TimesofIsrael: • • “Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment or hand over its uranium, state media reports, citing the head of the country’s Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami. • • Dismissing renewed US threats against Iran’s nuclear facilities as ‘nothing new,’ Eslami says enrichment was ‘an inseparable part’ of the nuclear process.” • • The United States, Israel and our Gulf allies would love nothing more than for the IRGC rump regime to abandon its plans for nuclear weapons and the conventional missile arsenal to defend those weapons. • • But the rump regime will not do that. So the battle will go even though Iran is defeated. As with the death rattles of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the same fanatical wheezing of threats and bluster —and the occasional missile fusillade— will continue until the regime collapses because it must. A modern nation state cannot long endure in the situation the Islamic Republic is in. Very dangerous but also defeated.
The Associated Press reported that the United States, Britain, France and Germany have prepared a draft resolution to refer Iran's nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council due to Tehran's failure to comply with non-proliferation commitments. The draft has not yet been officially submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, and negotiations on its text are ongoing. If submitted, the resolution will be put to a vote at the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna next week. A draft from IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi calls for the resolution to be sent to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, while also emphasizing support for a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program. The Associated Press reported that the Islamic Republic has not allowed IAEA inspectors access to damaged nuclear sites since the Khordad 1404 attacks, and the status of 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium has not been verified. The agency has warned that the continued lack of inspectors' access poses a "proliferation risk" that must be addressed "with the utmost urgency."
Where does the news lean?
4YES8NO2neutraltrailing 24h
Average match confidence across the listed signals: 92%.
What would make this resolve YES?
This market resolves to “Yes” if a written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran that establishes a commitment for Iranian-controlled enriched uranium to be downblended or diluted has been mutually signed or otherwise formally adopted by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”
A qualifying written instrument must provide for any quantity of enriched uranium held by Iran to be downblended or diluted to a lower enrichment level. The establishment of an enrichment cap or an enrichment moratorium, without a commitment to downblend or dilute already enriched uranium, will not qualify.
The instrument must require the dilution to occur within Iran, or for the diluted material to be returned to Iranian control, having been dilated or downblended elsewhere. Iran need not carry out the downblending or dilution itself; a commitment for a third-party entity (e.g., the IAEA) to perform it will qualify. A commitment to remove enriched uranium from Iranian territory does not qualify, unless the terms of the instrument specifically require the uranium to be diluted and the resulting diluted material be returned to Iran’s possession or control.
The dilution or downblending of Iranian enriched uranium must be expressed as a presently-agreed obligation to be implemented. A presently-agreed obligation to dilute Iranian uranium will qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the implementation schedule or exact dilution method, remain subject to future arrangements. A conditional commitment the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument (e.g., a commitment to negotiate a dilution requirement in a future agreement) will not qualify. A commitment explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation, will not qualify.
Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.
If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:
(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument;
(ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries;
(iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or
(iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.
Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.
An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied.
Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.
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