When will Russia announce a new forced mobilization?
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There are no plans for mobilization in Russia. This was stated by Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, answering questions from participants in the New Media Festival. He posted a fragment of his speech on his channel on the social network "Max." Medvedev noted that there are "quite enough" people who are already "fighting, having signed a contract" voluntarily. According to the politician, when in Ukraine "the unfortunate are being shoved onto buses, beaten, and dragged," the Ukrainian side "has no choice but to launch this topic [of mobilization in Russia] into the media landscape in order to reap dividends." RBC channel on "Max" RBC app for iOS and Android
600 thousand new mobilized: Russia is preparing a large-scale replenishment of the army, — GUR and SZRU The Russian leadership is working on plans for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people in 2026 and another 300 thousand in 2027, Ukrainian intelligence reported. According to GUR and SZRU, the Russian General Staff has already prepared the appropriate option. The reason is the increase in losses at the front and the slowdown in the recruitment of contract soldiers. In January-July 2026, Russia lost about 240 thousand soldiers, of which at least 140 thousand were irretrievable. About 232 thousand people were recruited under contract during this period. For the upcoming mobilization, the Russian Federation is strengthening military accounting and preparing new mechanisms of coercion. In particular, they plan to expand recruitment among prisoners - people with convictions for a number of serious crimes may be recruited into the army. The Russian leadership has also agreed to the possibility of mobilizing and/or contracting certain categories of women who are in prisons and camps. The mobilized are planned to be trained for 15 to 60 days, and part of the training may be conducted at training grounds in Belarus. Intelligence notes that Russia is already preparing a system of additional pressure on potential mobilized people: restrictions on leaving the country, obtaining loans, real estate transactions, blocking bank accounts and other measures. Most likely, the Kremlin may decide on a new wave of mobilization after the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for September 18–20. Add News.LIVE as a source of reliable news on Google
600 thousand new mobilized: Russia is preparing a large-scale replenishment of the army, — GUR and SZRU The Russian leadership is working on plans for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people in 2026 and another 300 thousand in 2027, Ukrainian intelligence reported. According to GUR and SZRU, the Russian General Staff has already prepared the appropriate option. The reason is the increase in losses at the front and the slowdown in the recruitment of contract soldiers. In January-July 2026, Russia lost about 240 thousand soldiers, of which at least 140 thousand were irretrievable. About 232 thousand people were recruited under contract during this period. For the upcoming mobilization, the Russian Federation is strengthening military accounting and preparing new mechanisms of coercion. In particular, they plan to expand recruitment among prisoners - people with convictions for a number of serious crimes may be recruited into the army. The Russian leadership has also agreed to the possibility of mobilizing and/or contracting certain categories of women who are in prisons and camps. The mobilized are planned to be trained for 15 to 60 days, and part of the training may be conducted at training grounds in Belarus. Intelligence notes that Russia is already preparing a system of additional pressure on potential mobilized people: restrictions on leaving the country, obtaining loans, real estate transactions, blocking bank accounts and other measures. Most likely, the Kremlin may decide on a new wave of mobilization after the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for September 18–20. Add News.LIVE as a source of reliable news on Google
600 thousand new mobilized: Russia is preparing a large-scale replenishment of the army, — GUR and SZRU The Russian leadership is working on plans for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people in 2026 and another 300 thousand in 2027, Ukrainian intelligence reported. According to GUR and SZRU, the Russian General Staff has already prepared the appropriate option. The reason is the increase in losses at the front and the slowdown in the recruitment of contract soldiers. In January-July 2026, Russia lost about 240 thousand soldiers, of which at least 140 thousand were irretrievable. About 232 thousand people were recruited under contract during this period. For the upcoming mobilization, the Russian Federation is strengthening military accounting and preparing new mechanisms of coercion. In particular, they plan to expand recruitment among prisoners - people with convictions for a number of serious crimes may be recruited into the army. The Russian leadership has also agreed to the possibility of mobilizing and/or contracting certain categories of women who are in prisons and camps. The mobilized are planned to be trained for 15 to 60 days, and part of the training may be conducted at training grounds in Belarus. Intelligence notes that Russia is already preparing a system of additional pressure on potential mobilized people: restrictions on leaving the country, obtaining loans, real estate transactions, blocking bank accounts and other measures. Most likely, the Kremlin may decide on a new wave of mobilization after the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for September 18–20. Add News.LIVE as a source of reliable news on Google
The Russian Federation wants to mobilize another 600 thousand people in 2026-2027, - intelligence data Ukraine has information that the Russian General Staff has already prepared an option for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people this year and 300 thousand people next year. First of all, the Russians plan to replenish the formations and military units fighting against the Ukrainians, as well as the units of the Russian troops that are currently being formed, inform the GUR and the SZR. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18-20 of this year. Read only the essence from RBC-Ukraine on Google.
The Russian Federation wants to mobilize another 600 thousand people in 2026-2027, - intelligence data Ukraine has information that the Russian General Staff has already prepared an option for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people this year and 300 thousand people next year. First of all, the Russians plan to replenish the formations and military units fighting against the Ukrainians, as well as the units of the Russian troops that are currently being formed, inform the GUR and the SZR. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18-20 of this year. Read only the essence from RBC-Ukraine on Google.
The Russian Federation wants to mobilize another 600 thousand people in 2026-2027, - intelligence data Ukraine has information that the Russian General Staff has already prepared an option for additional mobilization of 300 thousand people this year and 300 thousand people next year. First of all, the Russians plan to replenish the formations and military units fighting against the Ukrainians, as well as the units of the Russian troops that are currently being formed, inform the GUR and the SZR. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18-20 of this year. Read only the essence from RBC-Ukraine on Google.
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year.
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year.
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year.
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year. • •
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year. • •
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (2/2) • • The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime. • • One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is the significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across Russia’s regions (with levels reaching 69%) and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts. Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions and in Dagestan. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is also being recorded in many other Russian regions. • • In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. • • A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. • • Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year. • •
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (1/2) • • Russia is drawing up plans for an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, targeting 300,000 recruits this year and another 300,000 next year. • • An additional wave of mobilization is a response by Russia’s political leadership to the loss of the initiative in the war, continued increase in losses on the front, and significant slowdown in contract recruitment across Russia’s regions. • • Russia’s personnel losses in January–July 2026 amounted to approximately 240,000 people, of whom at least 140,000 were irrecoverable losses. Meanwhile, the number recruited under contract into the Russian occupation contingent during this period was 232,000. • • To allow for the recruitment of criminal elements under contract, Russia has started changing its legislation; control over military registration is being tightened, mechanisms are being created for the additional recruitment of people serving sentences in the Russian prison and penal camp system, and additional coercive measures are being developed. • • The training of those mobilized may last 15–60 days. The possibility of some of them being trained at training grounds in the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out. • •
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (1/2) • • Russia is drawing up plans for an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, targeting 300,000 recruits this year and another 300,000 next year. • • An additional wave of mobilization is a response by Russia’s political leadership to the loss of the initiative in the war, continued increase in losses on the front, and significant slowdown in contract recruitment across Russia’s regions. • • Russia’s personnel losses in January–July 2026 amounted to approximately 240,000 people, of whom at least 140,000 were irrecoverable losses. Meanwhile, the number recruited under contract into the Russian occupation contingent during this period was 232,000. • • To allow for the recruitment of criminal elements under contract, Russia has started changing its legislation; control over military registration is being tightened, mechanisms are being created for the additional recruitment of people serving sentences in the Russian prison and penal camp system, and additional coercive measures are being developed. • • The training of those mobilized may last 15–60 days. The possibility of some of them being trained at training grounds in the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out. • •
Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Service (1/2) • • Russia is drawing up plans for an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, targeting 300,000 recruits this year and another 300,000 next year. • • An additional wave of mobilization is a response by Russia’s political leadership to the loss of the initiative in the war, continued increase in losses on the front, and significant slowdown in contract recruitment across Russia’s regions. • • Russia’s personnel losses in January–July 2026 amounted to approximately 240,000 people, of whom at least 140,000 were irrecoverable losses. Meanwhile, the number recruited under contract into the Russian occupation contingent during this period was 232,000. • • To allow for the recruitment of criminal elements under contract, Russia has started changing its legislation; control over military registration is being tightened, mechanisms are being created for the additional recruitment of people serving sentences in the Russian prison and penal camp system, and additional coercive measures are being developed. • • The training of those mobilized may last 15–60 days. The possibility of some of them being trained at training grounds in the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out. • •
RF PLANS TO ADDITIONALLY MOBILIZE 300 THOUSAND IN 2026 AND 300 THOUSAND IN 2027 – GUR AND SZRU
Preparation of a new wave of mobilization in Russia: brief of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SZR (2/2) The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful response measures to possible negative social and economic consequences of the transition to a tougher military regime. One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war in the regions of Russia (indicators reach 69%) and a decrease in those willing to sign a contract. Problems with contracts are most evident in the Oryol and Vladimir regions, in Dagestan. A trend towards further decline in indicators is being observed in many other Russian regions. In addition, the Russian leadership plans to strengthen the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. A system for serving electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18–20 of this year.
Preparation of a new wave of mobilization in Russia: brief of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SZR (2/2) The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful response measures to possible negative social and economic consequences of the transition to a tougher military regime. One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war in the regions of Russia (indicators reach 69%) and a decrease in those willing to sign a contract. Problems with contracts are most evident in the Oryol and Vladimir regions, in Dagestan. A trend towards further decline in indicators is being observed in many other Russian regions. In addition, the Russian leadership plans to strengthen the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. A system for serving electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18–20 of this year.
Preparation of a new wave of mobilization in Russia: brief of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SZR (2/2) The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful response measures to possible negative social and economic consequences of the transition to a tougher military regime. One of the reasons for the additional wave of mobilization is a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war in the regions of Russia (indicators reach 69%) and a decrease in those willing to sign a contract. Problems with contracts are most evident in the Oryol and Vladimir regions, in Dagestan. A trend towards further decline in indicators is being observed in many other Russian regions. In addition, the Russian leadership plans to strengthen the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. A system for serving electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed. Most likely, the Russian leader will make a decision on mobilization after the "elections" to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which are scheduled for September 18–20 of this year.
Preparation of a new wave of mobilization in Russia: brief of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SVR (1/2) Russia is working on plans to conduct an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, expecting to recruit 300 thousand people this year and 300 thousand people next year. The additional mobilization is a reaction of the Russian political leadership to the loss of initiative in the war, the constant increase in losses at the front and a noticeable slowdown in the pace of recruiting contract soldiers in the regions of the Russian Federation. Russia's losses in personnel for January-July 2026 amounted to about 240 thousand people, of which at least 140 thousand are irretrievable. At the same time, 232 thousand people were recruited to the Russian occupation contingent under contract during this time. In order to attract criminal elements to contracts, the process of relevant changes in legislation has begun, control over military registration is being strengthened, mechanisms for additional recruitment of persons serving sentences in the system of Russian prisons and camps, and additional coercive measures are being created. The training of mobilized persons may last 15–60 days. It is not excluded that some of the mobilized persons may be trained at the training grounds of the Republic of Belarus.
Preparation of a new wave of mobilization in Russia: brief of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense and the SVR (1/2) Russia is working on plans to conduct an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, expecting to recruit 300 thousand people this year and 300 thousand people next year. The additional mobilization is a reaction of the Russian political leadership to the loss of initiative in the war, the constant increase in losses at the front and a noticeable slowdown in the pace of recruiting contract soldiers in the regions of the Russian Federation. Russia's losses in personnel for January-July 2026 amounted to about 240 thousand people, of which at least 140 thousand are irretrievable. At the same time, 232 thousand people were recruited to the Russian occupation contingent under contract during this time. In order to attract criminal elements to contracts, the process of relevant changes in legislation has begun, control over military registration is being strengthened, mechanisms for additional recruitment of persons serving sentences in the system of Russian prisons and camps, and additional coercive measures are being created. The training of mobilized persons may last 15–60 days. It is not excluded that some of the mobilized persons may be trained at the training grounds of the Republic of Belarus.
Dmitry Peskov called rumors about a new wave of mobilization in Russia "information canards." According to the presidential press secretary, such reports are being spread to destabilize the situation in the country. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram [in reply to: Russia does not need mass mobilization, said Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya. "At the moment, we do not need mass mobilization, and, as far as I know, it is not planned or expected," Mr. Nebenzya told journalists (quoted by TASS). At the end of July, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called reports about a possible new wave of mobilization in the country lies and a provocation. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram]
Dmitry Peskov called rumors about a new wave of mobilization in Russia "information canards." According to the presidential press secretary, such reports are being spread to destabilize the situation in the country. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram [in reply to: Russia does not need mass mobilization, said Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya. "At the moment, we do not need mass mobilization, and, as far as I know, it is not planned or expected," Mr. Nebenzya told journalists (quoted by TASS). At the end of July, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called reports about a possible new wave of mobilization in the country lies and a provocation. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram]
Dmitry Peskov called rumors about a new wave of mobilization in Russia "information canards." According to the presidential press secretary, such reports are being spread to destabilize the situation in the country. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram [in reply to: Russia does not need mass mobilization, said Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya. "At the moment, we do not need mass mobilization, and, as far as I know, it is not planned or expected," Mr. Nebenzya told journalists (quoted by TASS). At the end of July, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called reports about a possible new wave of mobilization in the country lies and a provocation. Subscribe to Kommersant on MAX | on Telegram]
What is this event about?
This market will resolve to "Yes" if, by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET, Russia formally announces either:
(i) a new compulsory military mobilization under the existing September 2022 mobilization framework, or an expansion of the categories of citizen to which that framework applies; or
(ii) the establishment or authorization of a new compulsory military mobilization outside the September 2022 mobilization framework.
Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No."
A qualifying announcement must communicate such a mobilization as a new policy of the Russian State. A formal legal act (e.g., an executive decree) that establishes or authorizes a qualifying mobilization, or expands the categories of citizens subject to one, will qualify as an announcement. Routine military operations not framed as a new policy, or actions not evidenced by any formal act or announcement, will not qualify.
Qualifying actions include, but are not limited to:
announcing a new wave or phase of mobilization;
announcing the expansion of the categories or ages of citizens subject to compulsory mobilization;
announcing the authorization of compulsory mobilization call-ups of citizens not subject to compulsory mobilization prior to the authorization; or
Mandating a specific number of new call-ups.
The following will not qualify: ordinary conscription decrees; electronic summons or draft-register measures; increases to the authorized size of the Armed Forces; routine draft administration; contract-recruitment measures; or new financial recruitment incentives.
Reserve training assemblies conducted within the statutory duration limits of Federal Law No. 53-FZ "On Military Duty and Military Service" (Article 54), and special assemblies limited to citizens who have voluntarily contracted into the mobilization human reserve will not qualify. However, a reserve-related measure, whether established through a new legal act or under an existing legal framework, will qualify if it is formally announced by the Russian State or established by a formal legal act and satisfies any of the following criteria:
authorizes or requires the deployment of compulsorily called-up reserve citizens to the zone of the "special military operation" or their assignment to combat formations;
permits compulsory retention of called-up citizens beyond the statutory duration limits that would otherwise apply to those citizens;
extends special-assembly-type compulsory service, or any comparable compulsory service obligation, to citizens of the inactive reserve (zapas) who have not voluntarily contracted into the mobilization human reserve;
establishes any further new category of compulsory military service for reserve citizens
The primary resolution sources will be official legal acts and official announcements published or issued by the Russian State.